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ABSTRACT: The question of capacity building in education has predominantly been 
approached with regard to the methods and methodologies of educational research. 
Far less attention has been given to capacity building in relation to theory. In many 
ways the latter is as pressing an issue as the former, given that good research depends 
on a combination of high quality techniques and high quality theorising. The ability to 
capitalise on capacity building in relation to methods and methodologies may 
therefore well be restricted by a lack of attention to theory. In this paper we make a 
case for capacity building with regard to theory, explore the different roles of theory in 
educational research, and provide an outline of an agenda for capacity building with 
regard to theory. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past decade there have been major initiatives within UK educational and 
social science research to address perceived capacity problems in the field (see Mills 
et al., 2006). Key initiatives include the TLRP1 Research Capacity Building Network, 
the Scottish Applied Educational Research Scheme and, more recently, the Welsh 
Education Research Network (see Davies and Salisbury, 2009; Fowler and Proctor, 
2008; Rees et al., 2007). What characterises these and other initiatives – including 
ESRC’s Research Methods Programme, its National Centre for Research Methods 
and its Researcher Development Initiative2 – is that they focus almost exclusively on 
capacity building with regard to the methods and methodologies of research. Far 
less attention, if any, has been given to capacity building in relation to theory. In 
many ways the latter is as pressing an issue as the former given that good research 
depends on a combination of high quality techniques and high quality theorising. 
The ability to capitalise on capacity building in relation to methods and 
methodologies may well be restricted, therefore, by a lack of attention to theory. In 
light of persistent concerns about the quality and relevance of educational research, 
nationally and internationally, and against the background of the results of the 2008 
UK Research Assessment Exercise3 in which the panel reviewing educational 
research explicitly mentioned its concerns about the quality of theorising in 
educational research, we therefore wish to make a case for a much more explicit 
engagement with the theory question in research capacity building in education. But 
what would that mean and how might this be done? 
 
In this paper we address this question primarily by means of an exploration of the 
different roles theory can play in educational research. It is, after all, only when we 
know what theory is doing or might do that we can begin to outline how we might 
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build capacity with regard to theory. We begin with a brief overview of the 
discussion on theory in education and provide an initial definition of ‘theory’. We 
then discuss the roles of theory in three different forms of research: research that 
aims to explain, research that aims to understand, and research that aims to 
contribute to emancipation. Next we focus on the ways in which theory can be said 
to ‘add plausibility’ to empirical findings. While the idea that theory can be used to 
‘add plausibility’ suggests an approach to research where the overall ambition is to 
make what is strange familiar, we show that research can also operate in the 
opposite mode where the aim is to make what is familiar strange. We then briefly 
discuss what we refer to as ‘autonomous theorising’, which is about forms of theory 
development that take place relatively independent from empirical research or 
educational practice. In the concluding section of the paper we discuss what this 
suggests for capacity building with regard to theory. We do this in the form of an 
agenda which both outlines areas for further development – that is, where we need 
to know more about the ways in which theory is deployed in educational research, 
practice and policy – and indicates ways in which capacity building with regard to 
theory might be advanced. 
 
2. The Theory Question In Education 
Questions about theory have been raised ever since education became an academic 
field of study (see, for example, Labaree, 2006; Lagemann, 2000; Thiersch et al., 
1978). In Germany this happened in 1779 when Ernst Christian Trapp became the 
first Professor of Education at the University of Halle (Ruprecht, 1978). Other 
countries followed (much) later. England, for example had its first Professor of 
Education in 1873, and Scotland in 1876 (see Monroe, 1911, pp. 401–409). 
Discussions about theory have often been conducted in terms of unhelpful 
dichotomies such as theory versus practice, the theoretical versus the empirical, or 
theoretical versus useful. Such rhetorical moves have tended to give theory a bad 
name. There are, however, compelling arguments for the need for theory (and we 
will return to this in more detail below). One goes back to David Hume’s insight that 
the only thing that can be empirically established is correlation between observable 
phenomena, and that theory is needed to generate explanations of underlying 
causative processes (Hume, 1999). In interpretative research a key role for theory 
lies in deepening and broadening understandings of ‘everyday’ interpretations and 
experiences (see, for example, Giddens 1976), while the primary interest of critical 
theory lies in exposing how hidden power structures influence and distort such 
interpretations and experiences (see Carr and Kemmis, 1986; Habermas, 1973). 
 
Within recent discussions about educational research there appears to be a 
tendency to move away from theory. We can see this, for example, in the idea that 
educational research should focus on generating knowledge about ‘what works’ – an 
idea which tends to prioritise the empirical (‘evidence’) over the theoretical (see, for 
example, Thomas and Pring, 2004; Biesta, 2007; 2010c). It is also manifest in more 
explicit discussions about the value of theory for educational research and practice. 
Both Carr (2006) and Thomas (2007) seem to be of the opinion that current 
research and practice are over-theorised and would benefit from less rather than 
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more theory (Thomas) or, in the case of Carr, of no theory at all. These discussions 
not only raise questions about the particular role of theory within the ‘paradigm’ of 
evidence-based education, but also indicate a need for a more precise analysis of the 
extent to which and the ways in which educational research and practice are 
actually overor under-theorised and why and how this might matter.4 
 
Any discussion of theory stands for the difficult task of defining what the word 
‘theory’ actually means. This, as we will show below, is not something that can be 
entirely resolved in the abstract. What a theory ‘is’ and what it ‘does’ depends to a 
large extent on the particular ‘work’ it is supposed to do, and within different 
historical and social contexts but also within different research traditions we can 
see that theory is expected to do different things.5 If we go back to the  reek origins 
of the word – which of course always raises the  uestion where the  reeks got their 
words from – theory (       ) has to do with spectatorship: being a spectator of a 
performance or a festival, including religious festivals, being an official envoy to a 
festival, consulting an oracle, or making a journey in order to study something. 
Interestingly the word ‘theory’ here is very much about the empirical: about direct 
experience and witnessing. With Plato and Aristotle, presumably partly as a result of 
the influence of Pythagoras, theory becomes concerned with the non-empirical, that 
is, with knowledge of Platonic ideas and Aristotelian forms. Theory becomes 
identified with knowledge of what is permanent and unchangeable in contrast to 
knowledge about the empirical world of change, flux and appearances. 
 
The distinction between the empirical and the theoretical gains further prominence 
with the rise of the scientific worldview of modern science where theory gets the 
role of providing explanations of the causal connections between observables. Here 
theory transforms into what  aston Bachelard (1986, p. 38) has referred to as ‘a 
science of the hidden’ – and we can find a similar role for theory in interpretative 
and critical forms of research. This suggests at least one important ‘ uality’ of 
theory, which is the fact that theory is generally deployed in order to make things 
visible or intelligible that are not immediately observable. In the natural sciences 
theory often performs this function by making plausible why certain laws – such as 
Ohm’s law or Boyle’s law – are as they are (which is done through accounts of the 
behaviour of electrons and electric charge or the behaviour of atoms in gasses 
respectively). In the social sciences theory performs this function by trying to make 
plausible why people act as they act or do as they do (for example through accounts 
of people’s perceptions and motivations or more fundamental ‘drives’ or through 
accounts of the complexities of social interaction and communication). This not only 
means that theory should be distinguished from laws or empirical generalisations. It 
also suggests that theory  uite often has a certain narrative ‘form’ (on this see also 
Norris, 1985). Whether this means that theory has to be understood as entirely 
speculative or as potentially supported or validated by empirical facts has been one 
of the ongoing discussions within twentieth-century philosophy of science, 
particularly in relation to questions about the relationship between facts and theory 
(see, for example, Dewey, 1938; Popper, 1968; Quine, 1963). 
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If this suffices as a very brief indication of what theory is ‘about’, we now turn to a 
more detailed discussion of the different roles theory can play in the conduct of 
educational research. 
 
3. Purposes Of Research And The Roles Of Theory 
Educational research shows a predominance of what we would term descriptive, 
analytical and reflective contributions to policy and practice. Some of the research 
simply tries to document what is going on, often using taken for granted categories 
as foundational, for example, teacher, learner, school, subject. In other cases, 
research moves more towards analysis, trying to identify trends, patterns and, in 
some cases, relationships between variables, aspects or dimensions. Such research 
focuses, for example, on the experiences of students, on teaching and tutoring 
practices, on assessment, on management, on policy and on wider trends and 
developments. Some of the descriptive and analytical work aligns itself uncritically 
with policy speak or fashionable concepts from research and theory. This is often 
done in the spirit of contributing to or impacting upon policy implementation or the 
improvement of practice, yet without asking any critical questions about content, 
focus, concepts or direction. Others draw sometimes substantively, sometimes 
gesturally and sometimes metaphorically on recognisable theories, such as activity 
theory, actor-network-theory, Lave and Wenger’s work on legitimate peripheral 
participation and communities of practice, complexity theory, problem-based 
learning theory, Kolb’s and Dewey’s work on experiential and experimental 
learning. Reference to, and use of ideas from theorists, such as Vygotsky, Bourdieu 
or Foucault waxes and wanes. We might conclude, therefore, that the field is actually 
doing well, that research and scholarship are flourishing, without there being an 
explicit strong presence of theory. So why would we need theory? Why would we 
want (more and better) theory? And why should we be concerned about an alleged 
absence of theory and the need to build capacity in this arena? 
 
A first answer to these questions can be given in relation to what we take to be the 
‘received’ view about the roles of theory in empirical research more generally. We 
refer to this as the received view because of the fact that many introductions into 
the theory and philosophy of empirical research in education and (other) social 
science disciplines tend to distinguish between three different approaches – often 
referred to with the rather unhelpful term of ‘paradigms’ (see Biesta, 2010a). 
Whereas these approaches are often characterised in terms of the kind of data they 
make use of – which has led to the equally unhelpful notions of quantitative and 
qualitative research – we find it more useful to make a distinction between three 
different purposes of social research: causal explanation; interpretation; and 
emancipation. In each case there are important reasons for the need for theory and 
theorising, and in each case theory performs a different function. 
 
As we have already alluded to, with regard to explanation the argument for theory 
goes back to David Hume’s insight that the only thing that can empirically be 
established is correlations between observable phenomena. Theory is therefore 
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needed to generate explanations of underlying causative processes and 
mechanisms. In interpretative research, the role for theory lies in deepening and 
broadening understanding of everyday interpretations and experiences. The task 
for theory here is not to describe what people are saying and doing, but to make 
intelligible why people are saying and doing what they are saying and doing. The 
primary interest of critical theory lies in exposing how hidden power structures 
influence and distort such experiences and interpretations. The ambition here is 
that the exposure of the workings of power can contribute to emancipation (see 
Carr and Kemmis, 1986; Habermas, 1973). 
 
When we look at the uses of theory in this way, we can already begin to make some 
sense of the state of theory in educational research. The predominance of 
descriptive and analytical research fits relatively neatly in the category of 
interpretative research. In a sense this is not surprising given that many would 
agree that education is a social – and therefore socially constructed and 
(re)produced – reality. Viewed in this way, education exists in and through people’s 
interpretations, meanings and actions, which means that in order to study education 
as a social phenomenon it has to gain access to these interpretations and meanings. 
This is, of course neither a new insight nor something that is specific for educational 
practices, as it is simply stating that social reality qua social reality is different from 
physical reality. 
 
To a certain extent this also explains the much smaller number of explanatory 
studies in educational research. The argument here is that ‘strong’ causal 
explanations are only possible if we can assume the existence of a reality in which 
there are ‘strong’ deterministic connections. While this might be a valid assumption 
for what is commonly referred to as physical reality – although recent advances in 
complexity theory have raised important questions about this (see Osberg and 
Biesta, 2010) – it is less likely to be a valid assumption in the social domain, mainly 
because any connections between ‘causes’ and ‘effects’ are achieved through 
interpretation which, in itself, is an open, non-deterministic process. This is not to 
say that it is not possible to find correlations between variables, but only that the 
modes of explanation of such correlations – and thus the underlying theorising – is 
unlikely to take the form of strong, deterministic causal connections. 
 
This helps us to give a first answer to the question as to what kind of theory we 
might need for educational research. We could say that to the extent to which we are 
interested in ‘causal’  uestions – that is in identifying and understanding 
correlations – we need theory that helps us to make plausible why things are 
correlated in the way they are. This is, of course, only a formal answer to this 
question and the real issue is what kinds of theory might perform this role 
satisfactorily. An important implication for theory and theorising is that any attempt 
to theorise correlations – either at ‘micro’ or ‘macro’ level – eventually has to focus 
on the actions and interpretations of individuals and groups, as it is only at that level 
and through such processes that connections are made/achieved. This means that 
interpretative forms of research are indispensable in any form of educational 
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research (and social science research more generally), not only in so-called 
interpretative research. On the basis of this reasoning comes a particular task for 
theorising, viz., to generate answers to the question as to why people are saying 
what they are saying, doing what they are doing, and acting in the way they are. It is 
here that theory again plays an important role, not to uncover causal connections 
but to ‘add plausibility’ to empirical findings. 
 
A strong version of ‘adding plausibility’ is Max Weber’s idea of explanatory 
understanding – erklärendes Verstehen (see Weber, 1980[1922]). The idea here is 
that the task of theory is to make the case, given the particular interpretations 
people have of the situation they are in, that it was rational for them to act in the 
way they acted. One of the key questions is whether we can assume that people will 
always act rationally. Weber’s answer to this question is mainly methodological, as 
he would argue that it is only to the extent to which we (can) assume that people act 
rationally that explanatory understanding is possible. We would argue that weaker 
forms of theorising in interpretative research still aim to ‘add plausibility’ to the 
accounts of social actors, first and foremost by giving re-descriptions of situations 
that make the actions of individuals and groups plausible. This is how we can, for 
example, characterise what happens when we re-describe situations through the 
lens of Foucault, Bourdieu, Lave and Wenger, or gender: we re-describe such 
situations as a ‘case of,’ for example, pastoral power, misrecognition, legitimate 
peripheral participations, or stereotypical gender relationships. 
 
This, obviously, is theoretical work and it plays an important role in interpretative 
research, and given that we have argued that this mode of research is inevitable in 
educational research, it means that these forms of theorising are, in a sense, 
themselves inevitable. But there are two important questions to be asked in relation 
to this. One is: What are we doing when we engage in these forms of theorising, that 
is, when we are saying that we are trying to ‘add plausibility’? The other is: Why 
would we engage in such forms of theoretical work? What is our motivation, 
ambition and agenda? 
 
4. Adding Plausibility? Making The Strange Familiar Or Making The Familiar 
Strange 
The idea that, through theorising, we ‘add plausibility’ to the accounts and 
articulations of individuals and groups is an important and well-rehearsed 
justification for the conduct of interpretative research. ‘Plausibility’ refers to the 
idea that we try to ‘make sense’ of the situations we encounter. But the ‘adding’ is 
important as well, since interpretations never simply copy or reproduce what is 
already there; they add a ‘layer’ or ‘dimension’ – or perhaps one should say in more 
neutral terms: they add text, they re-present. This strategy is sometimes referred to 
as that of making the strange familiar, i.e., trying to see something as a case of 
something we already (claim to) know and understand. ‘Adding plausibility’ is also 
related to the claim that interpretative research can ‘deepen’ and ‘broaden’ the 
experiences, articulations and interpretations of actors. But both notions – 
‘plausibility’ and ‘addition’ – raise further questions. One crucial question is of 
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course whose plausibility we are adding when we engage in theorising in 
interpretative research. The other question is whether we should use metaphors 
like ‘deepen’ and ‘broaden’ to articulate what we are doing when we engage in 
theorising, as these notions seem to suggest that theorising not simply adds 
something but also hints at an addition that is better. Is theorising therefore 
additional? Or is it just different? 
 
It is at this point that there is an important difference between interpretative and 
emancipatory or critical approaches. Whereas those working within an 
interpretative approach would probably see their theoretical work as a way to 
contribute to the available interpretations of social actors and thus would see this as 
that of offering alternative and additional interpretations, those working from a 
critical approach have a ‘higher’ ambition than just offering alternative 
interpretations. Their aim is to offer better interpretations than those generated by 
the social actors themselves, on the assumption that such first person 
interpretations may be distorted as a result of the workings of power, or, in more 
traditional critical language, as a result of the social position of actors. The 
demarcation line between interpretative and critical forms of theorising thus 
separates those who aim to add interpretations to those of social actors themselves 
from those who aim to replace actor interpretations. While the ambition of both 
might be expressed in terms of ‘adding plausibility’, there is a fundamental 
difference in how ‘plausibility’ is understood. The difference between ‘traditional’ 
and ‘critical’ forms of theorising – that is between traditional and critical theory 
(Horkheimer, 1937) – therefore not only lies in the form and content of theorising, 
but also in the ambition of theory and theorising. Whereas interpretative research 
would see theorising as contributing to reflection and learning, critical theory aims 
at a very particular set of learning processes, viz., those that lead to insight in how 
power and social position ‘structure’ experience, articulation and interpretation. 
This also means that these modes of theorising are based upon a different 
relationship between researcher and researched (or theoriser and theorised). 
Critical research, so we might say, has to start from a fundamental distrust in first 
person experiences and articulations, whereas interpretative research has no 
reason to start from distrust (see Biesta, 2010b). 
 
While there is, therefore, a fundamental difference between the role of theory in 
interpretative and critical-emancipatory research, both can still be characterised by 
the ambition to make the strange – that is what is not known or not understood – 
familiar, that is, bringing the strange into the sphere of what is already known and 
understood. The assumption here is that, if we have a better understanding of 
ourselves and the situations we are in, this will or may have a positive impact on our 
abilities to act. We are deliberately vague in our language here in order to capture 
the commonalities of interpretative and critical forms of theorising, although they 
do differ in their views about what constitutes a ‘better’ understanding and how and 
by whom such understandings can be generated. By indicating the ‘gesture’ that 
unites interpretative and critical approaches we can, in turn, outline a different role 
for theory in research, one that does not aim to make what is strange familiar, but 
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rather has the ambition to make what is familiar strange. 
 
One theorist who has explored the idea of research as a practice of making the 
familiar strange most explicitly is Michel Foucault.6 Although Foucault can be read – 
and often is read – as a theorist of power, his contribution is first and foremost a 
critique of critical theory and of a modern view of emancipation (see Biesta, 2008). 
The central notion in this regard is what Foucault writes as ‘power/knowledge’. 
Modern views of emancipation are based on the assumption that power and 
knowledge are separate so that we can use knowledge and understanding to expose 
and eventually overcome the workings of power – the truth will make us free. What 
Foucault aims to express with the idea of power/knowledge is that power and 
knowledge never occur separately. For Foucault power and knowledge always come 
together and this is the reason why he has argued that we should abandon ‘the 
whole tradition that allows us to imagine that knowledge can only exist where the 
power relations are suspended’ (Foucault, 1975, p. 27). To argue that we have to 
abandon this particular tradition is not to suggest that change is no longer possible, 
but is to highlight that we are always operating within power/knowledge 
‘constellations’ – that is, of power/knowledge ‘against’ power/knowledge – and not 
of knowledge versus power or power versus knowledge. Knowledge/representation 
and power/intervention are entailed by each other rather than separate from each 
other within an either/or logic. To challenge an existing educational order therefore 
requires the ordering of an alternative – of a ‘counter practice’ (Biesta, 1998). 
 
Some have read Foucault as saying that we will forever be caught in power and that 
no escape is possible, yet such a reading only makes sense as long as one assumes 
that a position outside of the confines of power is possible. This is precisely what 
Foucault denies. This does not mean, however, that action, change and critique are 
no longer possible, but that they take a different form. Foucault formulates the 
critical  uestion and the task for theory and theorising as follows: ‘(I)n what is given 
to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is 
singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints?’ (Foucault, 1984, p. 
45). Foucault refers to this strategy as ‘eventalisation’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 76). This, 
however, is not a process of understanding, of bringing what is strange into the 
domain of the known, but a ‘breach of selfevidence’ (ibid.). Foucault thus sees the 
task of research as that of ‘making visible a singularity in places where there is a 
temptation to invoke a historical constant, an immediate anthropological trait, an 
obviousness which imposes itself uniformly on all’ (ibid.). Rather than coming up 
with a single explanation, eventalisation works by constructing around the singular 
event a ‘polygon of intelligibility’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 77). Eventalisation is therefore 
not aimed at uncovering a deeper truth about what is going on, but rather urges 
researchers to pluralise and complicate understandings, articulations and 
interpretations. This means that the theoretical work needed for such an effort is 
not about bringing what is strange into the domain of understanding – theory rather 
has the task of generating more and different understandings. 
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5. ‘Autonomous’ Theorising 
Whereas the focus of the discussion so far has been on forms of theory and ways of 
theorising in the context of empirical research, there is also theoretical work in 
education that is not directly or immediately connected to empirical research. 
Rather than referring to this kind of theorising as non-empirical we suggest calling it 
‘autonomous’ theorising. The primary aim of this kind of theoretical work is what, 
following Richard Rorty (1989), we might refer to as the re-description of 
educational processes and practices. We use the notion of re-description in order to 
highlight the fact that educational processes and practices always already are 
described in particular ways. What theoretical work can do is to provide different, 
alternative descriptions of such processes and practices. It can suggest, for example, 
that learning to learn is either a strategy that empowers students or a form of 
governmentality that contributes to disempowerment. It can re-describe strategies 
to support the inclusion of students with special educational needs as processes of 
exclusion (Allan, 2008). It can suggest that assessment should not be seen as a way 
to judge learning outcomes but rather as a way to generate such outcomes. 
 
Such more autonomous forms of theorising can, on the one hand, provide important 
starting points for empirical research first and foremost with regard to the 
conceptualisation of the phenomena one wishes to investigate. While researchers 
may wish to study learning, it is only after they have engaged with the question of 
how to conceptualise learning – for example, as information processing, as 
behavioural change, as acquisition of knowledge, as participation in social practices 
– that it becomes possible to make decisions about what it is one needs to focus on 
and collect data about (which, in turn, feeds into decisions about methodology, 
design and methods). Some researchers, often those working at the interpretative 
end of the research spectrum, object to bringing theory in at the start of research as 
they feel it would bias the research findings and would blind researchers from 
seeing potentially relevant aspects that fall outside one’s particular frame. While it 
is, of course, always important to remain open in research, this particular objection 
fails to see that the world – and more specifically the social world – never appears 
unconceptualised so that not to engage with the ways in which one can 
conceptualise one’s research object runs the risk of uncritically accepting prevalent 
definitions and conceptions of the object under investigation. Yet to conceptualise 
learning as, for example, a response in no way defines what one will find through 
empirical investigation when starting from that assumption. In this regard (the role 
of theory in) conceptualisation never replaces the need for empirical work. 
 
More autonomous forms of theorising have, on the other hand, also a more direct 
practical significance, particularly where such forms of theorising help us to see 
things differently, so that it becomes possible to see the particular choices implied in 
existing descriptions and representations. More autonomous forms of theorising 
can help us to see, for example, that the language of learning is only one way to talk 
in and about education – a way, moreover, that makes some ways of thinking and 
speaking about education possible and makes other ways of thinking and speaking 
about education, and ultimately ways of ‘doing’ education, more difficult or even 
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impossible (see Biesta, 2006). 
 
6. Towards An Agenda For Research And Practice In Capacity Building 
The foregoing attempt to map some of the usages of theory in the field of education 
is not meant to be exhaustive but is being presented as a first step towards a more 
nuanced understanding of the different ways in which theory operates in relation to 
educational research and, to a lesser extent, also in relation to educational practice. 
Our paper is premised on the assumption that it is only when we have an 
understanding of what theory is doing or might do, that we can begin to outline how 
we might build capacity with regard to theory. While there is a whole industry of 
literature on the methods and methodologies of educational and social research – so 
that, in a sense, it is quite obvious what capacity building with regard to methods 
and methodologies needs to focus on – there is far less available on the roles of 
theory in such research. Since what has been presented in this paper is only a first 
step, further development of capacity building with regard to theory needs to be 
informed by a more nuanced and detailed understanding of both the possible and, 
more importantly, the actual roles of theory and theorising in educational research. 
What is needed, therefore, is not so much more theoretical and philosophical 
reflection on the uses of theory – and maybe most of the work currently available is 
confined to such reflection – but first of all systematic empirical and historical 
investigations into the kinds of theory and forms of theorising that are being used in 
educational research. Investigations, moreover, that not simply aim to describe and 
map, but also aim to develop a sense of how theory ‘works’, what it makes possible 
and also what it makes difficult or even impossible. 
 
Such work should not be confined to the domain of educational research, as theory 
also plays an important role in educational practice. There is, therefore, also a need 
to engage in a more systematic exploration of the forms of theory and ways of 
theorising that play a role in educational practices, again in order to map usage and 
generate understanding of what theory and theorising are ‘doing’. This is not only 
important for the enhancement of what we might term the ‘practical’ use of theory 
in education. Given that educational practices are not theory-free zones but are 
likely to be imbued by theory and may well be theory-generating themselves (see, 
for example, Whitehead 1989), it is also important to have an understanding of what 
theory is doing in educational practices. This is partly so as these practices 
constitute sites for educational research. But the theories that ‘circulate’ in 
educational practices also play an important mediating role in the uptake of insights 
from research. 
 
This suggests that capacity building with regard to theory needs more research on 
the actual roles of theory in educational research and educational practice and this, 
so we wish to suggest, is an important part of the agenda for capacity building as 
there is a continued challenge to improve our understanding of what it is that we 
need to build capacity in. But at the same time there are important practical 
questions to be asked about the aims and ends of such capacity building and the 
ways in which capacity with regard to theory might be built. Let us be clear here 
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that our interest is first and foremost in the improvement of empirical educational 
research and in the need to complement all the activities that focus on the methods 
and methodologies of research with a similar set of activities that focuses on the 
theoretical dimensions of research. We are not advocating, therefore, that capacity 
building with regard to theory should focus on what we have called ‘autonomous 
theorising’. We do not think, in other words, that the capacity building that is 
needed should focus on philosophy or sociology or psychology if, that is, the focus 
would be entirely ‘theoretical’, that is, disconnected from empirical research (which 
also raises an important challenge regarding the ways in which such forms of 
autonomous theorising can connect better to empirical research and educational 
practice). We also do not think that capacity building with regard to theory should 
focus on meta-theory and methodology or what some call the philosophy or the 
foundations of educational and social research. And perhaps this is one of the main 
mistakes (beginning) educational researchers often make, in that they conflate the 
theoretical framework for their research, that is, the theory or theories needed to 
conceptualise the object of investigation and to interpret empirical findings, with 
the philosophical assumptions – assumptions about knowledge and reality – that 
inform their research. The key challenge, so we wish to suggest, is to focus the 
attention on object-theory, that is, the theories we use to conceptualise the 
phenomena in which we are interested and the theories we use to ‘make sense’ of 
empirical findings (in the broad and divergent ways in which such sense-making can 
take place; see above). 
 
That is where the focus of attempts to build capacity with regard to theory – for 
example through formal courses, through seminars, master-classes or research 
apprenticeships – should be. It needs to start, therefore, from real examples of real 
research and, based on an informed understanding of the possible roles of theory, 
explore what the role of theory in such research is, how it impacts on the design and 
outcomes of the research, what alternatives were considered but not chosen, and 
how the particular theoretical framing has contributed to the overall quality of the 
research. The capacity that needs to be built here is not simply about knowledge and 
expertise but also requires the development of a capacity for judgement about the 
theoretical dimensions of educational research: judgement about the selection of 
theory; judgement about the utilisation of theory; and ongoing judgement about the 
contribution of the theoretical dimensions of the research to its overall quality. 
What is perhaps most needed, therefore, in capacity building with regard to theory, 
is the promotion of what, following Eisner (1998), we wish to refer to as ‘theoretical 
connoisseurship’ – the ability to make wise and informed judgements about the 
theoretical dimensions of educational research. 
 
One final point we wish to make has to do with the question of where the theoretical 
resources for the conduct of educational research should come from. In Britain, but 
also in North America and other English speaking countries, there is a strong 
tradition in which education is seen as an interdisciplinary field that gets its 
theoretical resources from a range of ‘other’ disciplines, including psychology, 
sociology, philosophy and history (see Furlong and Lawn, 2010; McCulloch, 2002). 
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This particular construction is quite different from how the field of educational 
studies has developed in Continental Europe, particularly in German speaking 
countries. Here there is a long-standing tradition in which education is seen as an 
academic discipline in its own right, with its own forms of theory and theorising 
(see Biesta, 2011). The question this raises, both for educational research and for 
capacity building, is what the differences between the two approaches are with 
regard to the roles of theory and also whether it might be important to consider the 
possibility of forms of theory and theorising that are distinctly educational in 
character, rather than that they are generated through ‘other’ academic disciplines. 
This is why it is important to engage with the task of capacity building in the domain 
of theory in a way that is international, comparative and historical in outlook, so as 
to be able to recognise the different ways in which the study of education has 
developed in different countries and settings and learn from the different ways in 
which different forms of theory play a role in the study of education (see, for 
example, Gundem and Hopmann, 2002; Horn, 2003; Keiner, 2002). 
 
At the Laboratory for Educational Theory (www.theorylab.co.uk) at the School of 
Education of the University of Stirling we have made a start with developing an 
infrastructure for capacity building in the domain of theory. Through the 
organisation of local, national and international seminars, a biennial international 
conference, courses and programmes for doctoral students, and other events we 
have begun to explore some of the issues mentioned in this paper in a more 
systematic manner and have started to engage the international educational 
research community in the conversation about theory. Discussions with students 
and scholars from many different countries have not only confirmed our view that 
the question of theory in educational research and educational practice is of crucial 
importance for the promotion of high quality research and good and just 
educational practice, but has also shown that capacity building in this domain is as 
important and urgent as capacity building with regard to methods and 
methodologies. 
 
Endnotes 
1  TLRP – the Teaching and Learning Research Programme – was a large scale strategic co-ordinated 
research effort aimed at improving the quality of educational research in the UK (see www.tlrp.org).  
2  The ESRC – the Economic and Social Research Council – is the major funder of educational and 
social research in the UK.  
3  The Research Assessment Exercise is a UK-wide evaluation of the quality of research outputs, 
environments and impact of all academic research in the UK. The exercise is conducted every seven 
or eight years. The RAE started in the 1990s and the next cycle – renamed Research Excellence 
Framework – is due to take place in 2013.  
4  While Thomas (2007) provides a sustained critique of the role of theory in educational research 
and educational practice, he focuses almost exclusively on reasons why there should be ‘less theory’ 
(pp. 142–168) and makes very little effort to indicate where and how theory might actually be useful 
or even necessary. While the verdict on how much theory a field like education needs remains open, 
we do think that it is important to start such a discussion with an accurate understanding of the 
(potential) roles of theory – which is what we aim to provide in this paper.  
5  It is therefore unrealistic to demand, as Thomas (2007, p. 24) does, that ‘”theory” as a word must 
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be one thing or another [and] cannot – if it is to be used seriously to describe a particular kind of 
intellectual construction in education – have two or more meanings.’  
6  It is important to note that we are not presenting Foucault here as one of the possible theories that 
can be used in educational research, but as articulating a particular approach to and understanding of 
(social and educational) research. The discussion of Foucault in this section is, to put it differently, 
one at the level of meta-theory or methodology, not at the level of object-theory.  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